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ABTRACT: Following the return of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency, 
the specific features of Russian foreign policy under the 2008-12 presidency of 
Dmitrii Medvedev can now be analysed. This paper investigates how significant 
the foreign policy differences were between Medvedev and Putin; the 
importance of Medvedev’s influence and the achievements of Russian foreign 
policy under his presidency. It argues that Medvedev’s presidency did not lead 
to fundamental change in Russia foreign policy, but allowed an improvement in 
relations with the West and the maintenance of the strategic partnership with 
China. However, both Putin and Medvedev shared a belief in Russia as a great 
power and a pragmatic outlook. Both opposed NATO enlargement into the 
former Soviet Union although Medvedev leaned more towards collaboration 
with the West, and Putin towards integration based on the CIS. Relations with 
the West deteriorated at the end of the Medvedev presidency following the 
announcement of Putin’s planned return to the Kremlin and the rigging of 
parliamentary elections. However, five major foreign-policy achievements can 
be identified: the postponement of NATO enlargement into post-Soviet space 
following war with Georgia; the defeat of the leaders of the Orange Revolution 
in Ukraine; the ‘New START’ treaty; entry to the WTO; and the implementation 
of the Common Economic Space with Belarus and Kazakhstan. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
With the return of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency in May 2012, it is now 
possible to analyse the specific features of Russian foreign policy under the 
presidency of Dmitrii Medvedev over his four-year term from May 2008. The 
individuals with the most important influence over foreign policy in this period were 
the president, Medvedev, and the prime minister, Putin. This paper investigates how 
significant were the differences between Medvedev and Putin in foreign policy; how 
important was Medvedev’s influence in Russian foreign policy; and what were the 
achievements of Russian foreign policy under his presidency.1 
  
 In a liberal democracy, one would also expect the president and/or the prime 
minister to have the final say in foreign policy. With the weakness of formal 
institutions and the corresponding personalization of politics in Russia,2 the focus on 
the top individuals is even more justified. According to the Russian Constitution of 
1993, the president ‘exercises leadership of the foreign policy of the Russian 
Federation’.3 Boris El’tsin and Putin, the first two presidents of the Russian 
                                               
1 This working paper forms the basis of a chapter in Peter J.S. Duncan Russian Foreign Policy: From 
El’tsin to Putin, to be published in the BASEES/Routledge series. I should like to thank the 
Leverhulme Trust for awarding me a Leverhulme Research Fellowship for 2009/2010, which included 
funding for a research visit to Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova and made the preparation of this 
paper possible. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at a seminar of the Centre for European 
Politics, Security and Integration (CEPSI) at the UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies in 
December 2012, and at the joint British Association of Slavonic and East European Studies – 
International Committee for Central and East European Studies conference, Fitzwilliam College, 
Cambridge, in April 2013. I am grateful for the comments of those present, and of Seán Hanley, Sirke 
Mäkinen, Valerie Pacer, Olga Romanova, Jack Sharples, Ondrej Timco and an anonymous reviewer. 
All errors are my own. 
2 On the weakness of formal institutions and the importance of informal rules in Russia, see Alena 
Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices that Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and 
Business, Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2006. 
3 Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow: Izdatel’stvo iuridicheskoi literatury, 1993, Article 86. 
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Federation, had indeed been the principal decision-makers on foreign policy, as on 
domestic issues. But there was a broad perception in Russia and outside it from the 
time of Medvedev’s nomination in December 2007 as the presidential candidate for 
Putin’s United Russia, A Just Russia and two other parties and Medvedev’s 
announcement the following day that Putin would be his prime minister that the latter 
would continue to be the strongest and most influential politician in Russia. The two 
might be leading in tandem, but it was Putin who was doing most of the steering. This 
perception was reinforced on 24 September 2011, when Medvedev announced that 
Putin, not himself, would be the United Russia presidential candidate in 2012. 
Moreover, he claimed that this had been agreed already in December 2007.  
 
 It was undoubtedly the case that as prime minister Putin was the most 
powerful figure in domestic, economic and social affairs. This extended into most 
matters of foreign economic relations, including economic integration projects within 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), international trade, the arms trade, 
and energy, including the operations of Gazprom. In the USSR the prime minister 
traditionally focused on the economy, with little say on ideology, security and foreign 
policy, while the General Secretary of the Party had overall charge of all internal and 
external affairs. A similar situation continued under El’tsin and Putin’s presidencies, 
with the prime minister focussing on economic and social issues. Foreign and security 
policy remained a presidential prerogative; indeed, Putin claimed in late 2011 that he 
had given Medvedev carte blanche in this area.4 Nevertheless before leaving the 
presidency in 2008, Putin ensured that an amendment to the Law on the Government 
was passed, so that the ‘power ministers’ (the ministers of defence, internal affairs, 
emergency situations, the heads of the security services and the foreign minister) 
reported to the prime minister, instead of directly to the president. Additionally, Putin 
created under the prime minister an office for foreign policy implementation, headed 
by Iurii Ushakov, hitherto Russian ambassador in Washington; and a new agency for 
CIS affairs, separate from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.5 
 
 Who, then, really was more important in foreign policy – Putin or Medvedev? 
Did they have the same opinions? Did they represent different interests, in any sense? 
Even if they were both primarily concerned with devising foreign policies which 
would be most conducive to the survival of the existing political regime in Russia, did 
they have any differences in what was the optimum strategy to achieve this? Experts 
on Russia have been divided over these questions. The International Institute of 
Strategic Studies commented that over the four years, ‘it had been difficult to discern 
which of the Putin-Medvedev tandem was responsible for the country’s mixed record 
of foreign-policy successes and failures.’6 Others have drawn a clear distinction 
between the two. U.S. President Barack Obama contrasted Putin and Medvedev in 
July 2009, saying that America was developing a ‘very good relationship’ with 
                                               
4 Nikolai Zlobin, ‘Putin doesn’t need anyone – no team, no advisors, no successors’, Nikolai Zlobin's 
Political Blog (first published in Snob, 15 October 2011), http://n-zlobin-
eng.livejournal.com/4239.html, accessed 15 July 2013. 
 
5 Mikhail Filippov, ‘Diversionary Role of the Georgia-Russia Conflict: International Constraints and 
Domestic Appeal’, Europe-Asia Studies, 61, 10, December 2009, 1840. 
6 ‘Assessing Russian foreign policy under Medvedev’, IISS Strategic Comments, email journal, 18, 18, 
May 2012. 
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Medvedev, while Putin had ‘one foot’ stuck in the Cold War past.7  The predominant 
view has been to see Medvedev essentially as Putin’s puppet (marionetka). In similar 
vein is the image conveyed in the well-known cable from the US deputy chief of 
mission in Moscow, Eric Rubin, to the State Department in November 2008, 
published by Wikileaks, referring to Medvedev as ‘Robin’ to Putin’s ‘Batman’. 
Another cable saw Medvedev as the No. 3, less powerful than the leading silovik and 
deputy prime minister Igor’ Sechin.8 Medvedev was keeping the presidency safe for 
Putin, following his instructions. By 2010 some were seeing Medvedev as ‘simply the 
exportable version of Putinism’.9 Marie Mendras writes that Putin ‘kept the upper 
hand on all important matters in domestic as well as foreign affairs.’10 Arkady Moshes 
argues that the style differences between the two ‘did not grow into a real policy 
difference – not least, perhaps because Putin …informally was still in command of 
Russia’s political behaviour, both internally and externally’.11 Liliia Shevtsova and 
David Kramer summed up his legacy: ‘He enabled Putin’s personalised rule to 
continue unabated.’12 
 
 I disagree with this trend of opinion. There were several occasions when 
Medvedev and Putin expressed differences of opinion with each other, in domestic 
and foreign affairs. It seems that in foreign policy Medvedev’s position prevailed. 
These differences were not numerous, however. Both were brought up in Leningrad, 
had law degrees, and both thought of themselves as European. More importantly, 
Medvedev was embedded in Putin’s team; he owed his political fortune to Putin, and 
they had worked together since 1990.13 Hence, not only did they have a vested interest 
in the survival of the tandem as the core of the political regime, but also they had very 
close views on many issues, with differences on some others. They both believed that 
Russia should be one of the world’s most influential powers; but while Putin tended to 
see the immediate means for that in building up influence in post-Soviet space, 
Medvedev tended to see it in cooperation with other great powers. The perception 
which took hold in some quarters that Medvedev was as hard-line, assertive and 
conservative as Putin came from the fact that the beginning of his presidency was 
marred by the occurrence of the war with Georgia. 
 
 For some years before his nomination for the presidency, Medvedev had been 
seen as part of the liberal wing of the regime. In July 2006 he had openly opposed the 
concept proposed by the Kremlin’s chief ideologist, Viacheslav Surkov, of ‘sovereign 
                                               
7 Chris McGreal and Luke Harding, ‘Barack Obama: Putin has one foot in the past’, Guardian,  2 July 
2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jul/02/obama-putin-us-russia-relations, accessed 15 July 
2013.. 
8 Luke Harding, Mafia State: How One Reporter became an Enemy of the Brutal New Russia, London: 
Guardian Books, 2011, pp. 214-5. The term silovik refers to a member or ex-member of the Russian 
security services or the armed forces. 
9 Ibid., p. 222. 
10 Marie Mendras, Russian Politics: The Paradox of a Weak State, London: Hurst, 2012, p. 277. 
11 Arkady Moshes, ‘Russia’s European Policy under Medvedev: How Sustainable is a New 
Compromise?’,  International Affairs, 88, 1, January 2012, p. 18. 
12 Lilia Shevtsova and David J. Kramer, ‘Medvedev the Phony’, 7 May 2012, Foreign Policy website, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/07/medvedev_the_phony, accessed 16 May 2012. 
13 Andrew Monaghan, ‘The Russian Vertikal: The Tandem, Power and the Elections’, May 2011, 
Chatham House, Russia and Eurasia Programme Paper, REP 2011/01, 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/175813, accessed 17 April 2013.  
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democracy’, seeing it as implying a limitation on democracy.14 He did not belong to 
either of the main silovik factions, and his selection represented a defeat for them. 
Medvedev’s support base centred on the ‘Petersburg lawyers’, who included Anton 
Ivanov, head of the Supreme Arbitration Court, Dmitrii Kozak, minister for regional 
development and from October 2008 deputy prime minister, Procurator-General Iurii 
Chaika, ‘and possibly [the oligarchs] Viktor Vekselberg and Alisher Usmanov’.15 
According to Richard Sakwa, his candidacy was advocated by former members of 
El’tsin’s ‘Family’, including Roman Abramovich and Aleksandr Voloshin, while his 
allies also included presidential economic advisers Igor Shuvalov and Arkadii 
Dvorkovich, Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin, ‘Economic Development and Trade 
Minister Elvira Nabiullina, Agriculture Minister Aleksei Gordeev and Education and 
Science Minister Andrei Fursenko’.16 These people, either for reasons of state 
economic policy or for commercial and personal interest, would be expected to favour 
good relations with Western states.   
 
 It is important to emphasize that these figures who supported Medvedev’s 
nomination were not, or at least not at that stage, supporting Medvedev as a long-term 
replacement for Putin. They favoured Medvedev as the candidate for 2008, rather than 
agreeing with those siloviki who supported the candidacy of First Deputy Prime 
Minister Sergei Ivanov, or those like the deputy head of the presidential 
administration, the arch-hard-line silovik Igor Sechin, who favoured changing the 
constitution to allow Putin a third term. They broadly shared, in domestic policy, in 
the context of the existing regime, a desire for more respect to be given to the rule of 
law, and a reduction in the role of the state in the economy to give more independence 
to private business.17 Sechin can be seen as Medvedev’s nemesis: as deputy head of 
the presidential administration and chairperson of the Rosneft board, from 2004 he 
acquired the assets of Yukos after the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovskii, and later 
defeated an attempt by Medvedev as head of the presidential administration and 
chairperson of the Gazprom board, initially with Putin’s support, to implement a 
takeover by Gazprom of Rosneft. 
 
 Past work on opinion groups in relation to Moscow’s foreign policy has 
sought to draw links between opinions held on domestic policy and foreign policy. 
Mikhail Gorbachev himself highlighted the connection between domestic glasnost’ 
and perestroika with the ‘new political thinking’ in his foreign policy.18 Margot Light 
in her seminal chapter identified three opinion groups in the early 1990s: ‘Liberal 
Westernizers’, who favoured market reform and pro-Western foreign policies, 
‘Fundamentalist Nationalists’ who opposed economic reform and were extreme anti-
Western nationalists in foreign policy, and ‘Pragmatic Nationalists’ who occupied an 
                                               
14 Richard Sakwa, The Crisis of Russian Democracy: The Dual State, Factionalism and the Medvedev 
Succession, Cambridge: CUP, 2011, pp. 126-7. 
15 Alena V. Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance, 
Cambridge: CUP, 2013, p. 59. 
16 Sakwa, Crisis of Russian Democracy, p. 271. 
17 On the elections of 2007 and 2008 and the Medvedev accession, see Sakwa, Crisis of Russian 
Democracy; and my ‘Russia, the West and the 2007-2008 Electoral Cycle: Did the Kremlin Really Fear 
a ‘Coloured Revolution’?’, Europe-Asia Studies, 65, 1, January 2013, 1-25. 
18 Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World, London: Collins, 
1987. 
 5 
intermediate position in both areas.19 This linkage between domestic and foreign 
policy worked quite well through the El’tsin era, but Putin broke the connection in his 
first term by combining a predominantly pro-Western policy in support of George W. 
Bush’s ‘War on Terror’ with increasing authoritarianism at home. In Putin’s second 
term the authoritarian trends accelerated, while foreign policy took on more and more 
an assertive, anti-Western tone. The coloured revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and 
Kyrgyzstan, plans for further NATO enlargement and Bush’s plans for missile 
defence (MD) deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic provoked Putin’s 
Munich speech of February 2007 which denounced the United States for its 
interventionism.20 Parts of the top leadership seem to have feared that the West might 
try to overthrow the regime in Russia itself. 
 
 During Medvedev’s presidency, as during Putin’s second term, one can see a 
clearer link between domestic and foreign policy. Where differences did emerge 
between Medvedev and Putin, both in domestic and in foreign policy, Medvedev’s 
position was practically always more liberal domestically and more in favour of better 
relations with Western states than Putin’s stance. During his election campaign he 
attacked ‘legal nihilism’ in Russia, describing it as ‘far from a true democracy’, while 
calling for an active role in relation to CIS states and an openness to the world 
community.21 After his election, he was more outspoken. His internet article ‘Go, 
Russia!’ (Rossiia, vpered!) spoke of ‘…humiliating dependence on raw materials…an 
inefficient economy, semi-Soviet social sphere, fragile democracy, negative 
demographic trends, and an unstable Caucasus’. The answers included introducing an 
‘extremely open’ political system, in which ‘the parties and the coalitions they will 
make will choose the federal and regional executive authorities (and not vice versa)’. 
The link with foreign policy was explicit: ‘Nostalgia should not guide our foreign 
policy and our strategic goal is modernization.’22  
 
Mark Urnov has drawn out the links between domestic policy and foreign 
policy in his analysis of ‘liberal modernization’ and ‘conservative modernization’ 
doctrines. Liberal modernization, including political reforms, is exemplified by the 
Institute for Contemporary Development (INSOR). This institute is headed by Igor’ 
Iurgens and considered close to Medvedev. In 2010 it published its plan ‘Russia in the 
XXI Century: Vision for the Future’, which in foreign policy prioritizes relations with 
the West. Conservative modernization, which avoids political change, is exemplified 
by ‘The Concept for the Long-term Socio-economic Development of the Russian 
                                               
19 Margot Light, ‘Foreign Policy Thinking’, in Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison and Margot 
Light, Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, Oxford: OUP for the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1996, p. 34. 
20 V.V. Putin, ‘Vystuplenie i diskussiia na myunkhenskoi konferentsii po voprosam politiki 
bezopasnosti’, 10 February 2007, http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2007/02/118109.shtml, accessed 
23 February 2007.  
21 D. Medvedev, ‘Vystuplenie na II Obshcherossiiskom grazhdanskom forume’, 22 January 2008, 
Dmitrii Medvedev. Official site of the candidate for the post of president of Russia, 
http://www.medvedev2008.ru/performance_2008_01_22.htm, accessed 10 March 2008. 
22 ‘Dmitry Medvedev’s Article, Go Russia!’, 10 September 2009, President of Russia website, 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/speeches/2009/09/10/1534_type104017_221527.shtml, accessed 15 
September 2009. 
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Federation up to 2020’ adopted by the Ministry for Economic Development in 2008. 
The associated foreign policy is oriented first to the CIS and China.23 
Medvedev’s enthusiasm for reform led Putin to warn him publicly in January 
2010 of the danger of the ‘Ukrainianization’ of Russian politics.24 In December 2010, 
during Mikhail Khodorkovskii’s second trial, Putin pronounced, ‘A thief belongs in 
jail.’ Medvedev responded that it was impermissible to interfere in the judicial 
process.25 In practice, the president was unable to implement the democratic reforms 
he espoused, or prevent what was for him the humiliating farce of Khodorkovskii’s 
further sentencing, because Putin kept the levers of internal affairs in his own hands. 
Nevertheless, as the US diplomat Thomas Graham has noted, Medvedev’s presidency 
broadened the framework of political discussion in Russia, and facilitated the 
improvement of relations with Western countries with his ‘more “modern” face’.26 
Gordon Hahn has referred to the domestic aspects of Medvedev’s presidency as 
‘Perestroyka 2.0’, recalling the changes in politics and society under Gorbachev,27 
although Medvedev did not introduce an ideological equivalent to Gorbachev’s ‘new 
political thinking’ in foreign policy. 
 
 Among the key figures involved in foreign policy during Medvedev’s 
presidency, including those supervising the key energy corporations, were: 
 
MEDVEDEV Dmitrii Anatol’evich (born 1965). President  
PUTIN Vladimir Vladimirovich b. 1953. Prime Minister  
LAVROV Sergei Viktorovich b. 1950. Minister of Foreign Affairs  
ZUBKOV Viktor Alekseevich b. 1941. First Deputy Prime Minister, Gazprom chair  
IVANOV Sergei Borisovich b. 1953. Deputy PM responsible for defence industry 
SECHIN Igor’ Ivanovich b. 1960. Deputy PM responsible for energy + (until late 
2011) Rosneft chair  
SERDIUKOV Anatolii Eduardovich. b. 1962. Minister of Defence  
PATRUSHEV Nikolai Pavlovich b. 1951. Secretary, Security Council 
PRIKHOD’KO Sergei Eduardovich b. 1957. Foreign policy adviser to the president. 
 
The extent to which Medvedev’s hands were tied is suggested by the fact that all these 
nine men remained in the above positions throughout his presidency. Apart from 
Medvedev and Putin themselves, all were in those positions before Medvedev became 
president, except that Zubkov and Ivanov were demoted from prime minister and first 
deputy prime minister, respectively, making room for Putin’s appointment; and 
Patrushev was moved from the directorship of the FSB to the Security Council four 
                                               
23 Mark Urnov, ‘Russian Modernization Doctrines under Debate’, in Lena Jonson and Stephen White 
(eds), Waiting for Reform under Putin and Medvedev, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012, pp. 38-58. 
24 Brian Whitmore, ‘Putin Crashes Medvedev's Party’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 25 January 
2010, http://www.rferl.org/content/Putin_Crashes_Medvedevs_Party/1939426.html , accessed 3 April 
2013. 
25 ‘Medvedev versus Putin on business, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the World Trade Organization, Libya, 
and a whole lot more’, Forbes, 13 July 2011, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2011/07/13/medvedev-versus-putin-on-business-mikhail-
khodorkovsky-the-world-trade-organization-libya-and-a-whole-lot-more/, accessed 3 April 2013. 
26 Thomas Graham, ‘Russia and the World’, in Maria Lipman and Nikolay Petrov (eds), Russia in 
2020: Scenarios for the Future, Washington, DC: Carnegie, 2011, p. 20. 
27 Gordon M. Hahn, ‘Perestroyka 2.0: Toward Non-Revolutionary Regime Transformation in Russia?’, 
Post-Soviet Affairs, 28, 4, 2012, 472-515. 
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days after Medvedev’s inauguration. It should also be seen that they were all older 
than Medvedev. 
 
 I have divided Medvedev’s presidency for the purpose of considering his 
foreign policy into three periods: from his inauguration in May 2008 to the proposal 
for a ‘Reset’ in February 2009; from then until 24 September 2011, when he 
announced that Putin would be the presidential candidate in the next election; and 
from then until Putin’s inauguration in May 2012, a period in which as a lame-duck 
president Medvedev lost most of his capacity to initiate policy change.  
 
May 2008 to February 2009. The war with Georgia 
 
 The ideas which dominated foreign policy under Medvedev were formulated 
in the first few months of his presidency. In June 2008 in Berlin he called for a new 
European security architecture to give Russia what he thought was its rightful level of 
influence. NATO and the EU, which did not include Russia, were taking the key 
decisions on European security.28 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, which Russia had earlier argued should have the main security role, was now 
focussing on issues of ‘soft security’ such as the fairness of elections and human 
rights. It was devoting its time to criticising Russia and other CIS states, while 
neglecting hard security issues. What rankled with the Russian elite at this time was 
that it had not been able to transform its new-found wealth, the product of several 
years of high oil and gas prices, into international influence, even in Europe and its 
own neighbourhood.  
 
In February 2008 Kosovo had declared independence, which had been 
recognized by the USA, the UK and most of the EU. The humiliation for Russia of 
being unable to prevent Kosovo from being separated from Serbia, its closest friend in 
Europe, recalled Russia’s earlier humiliation in 1999 in being unable to protect 
Yugoslavia from NATO bombing. At that time Russia’s economy was just beginning 
to recover from the 1998 rouble crash, but in 2008 Russia had repaid most of its state 
debt and felt its economy strong. In April 2008, at the NATO summit in Bucharest, 
Russia had successfully lobbied France and Germany to prevent Ukraine and Georgia 
from being offered membership action plans (MAPs) or a date for membership, but 
nevertheless Bush succeeded in persuading the NATO members to promise the 
applicants membership at an unspecified date in the future. The NATO-Russia 
Council, established in 2002 during Putin’s enthusiastic participation in the War on 
Terror, was no longer affording Russia an effective voice. Instead NATO was openly 
threatening Russia’s back garden. Although the European security proposals were 
always associated with Medvedev’s name, there is no evidence that Putin disapproved 
of them. On the contrary, they were in line with his desire to reduce America’s and 
NATO’s influence in Europe. What was new was that they were launched by a new 
leader who showed a greater propensity to listen to Western opinions than his 
predecessor had in recent years. 
 
 In July 2008 Medvedev signed a new foreign policy concept. This built on the 
concept signed by Putin in 2000. The timing of its publication demonstrated that it 
                                               
28 Dmitrii Medvedev, ‘Vystuplenie na vstreche s predstaviteliami politicheskikh, parlamentskikh i 
obshchestvennykh krugov v Germanii’, Berlin, 5 June 2008, President of Russia website, 
http://news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/320, accessed 14 October 2011.  
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must have been prepared during Putin’s presidency, and it reflected views which Putin 
had articulated. The document welcomed the ‘strengthening of Russia’ and that it was 
playing an increased role in international affairs, contributing to a ‘tendency to a 
polycentric world order’ (in contrast to the danger of a ‘unipolar world’ described in 
the 2000 concept). It warned, however, that ‘global competition’ was acquiring a 
‘civilizational dimension’, and the ‘historical West’ was continuing the policy of 
‘containment’ (sderzhivanie) of Russia. Without naming the United States or NATO 
in this context (unlike the 2000 document), it opposed the ‘strategy of unilateral 
actions’ and the ‘ignoring by particular states or groups of states of international law’. 
The document emphasized Russia’s commitment to international cooperation. The 
highest regional priority was the CIS, and after that, Europe and Euro-Atlantic 
security.29 
 
 On 31 August, after the war with Georgia, Medvedev announced that he 
would base foreign policy on five ‘positions’. First was the supremacy of international 
law. Second was that the world must be multipolar. The domination of the USA was 
unacceptable. Third, that Russia did not want conflict, but friendly relations with all 
countries. Fourth was the defence of ‘our citizens’ (not the vague ‘compatriots’) 
wherever they were, and of ‘our entrepreneurial community abroad’. Fifthly and 
controversially, Russia had regions including countries where it had ‘privileged 
interests’. When asked whether these priority regions were Russia’s border territories, 
Medvedev answered that it included the border regions, but not only them (‘ne 
tol’ko’).30 This claim to an ambiguously defined sphere of influence reflected the 
view, shared with Putin, that such a sphere was an attribute of Russia as a great 
power. 
 
 The five-day war in August 2008 was the first time in the post-Soviet period 
that Russian troops invaded and temporarily occupied another country.31 Was this war 
Medvedev’s initiative? Why did the war break out? One can postulate several reasons 
why Russia, and Medvedev in particular, might have wanted a war with Georgia, 
assuming it was victorious. For Medvedev, it might show his strength to audiences at 
home and abroad; and gain him support at home as a real president, not a soft one or a 
puppet of Putin. Together with his tough stance towards Ukraine, it might prove his 
credentials as a defender of Russian interests to the siloviki. It might punish the West 
for creating and recognizing Kosovo, and punish Georgia’s president Mikheil 
Saakashvili for his anti-Russian attitudes. It might stop NATO enlargement into 
Georgia and Ukraine. It might reinforce Russia’s influence in post-Soviet space. It 
might show the vulnerability of the oil and gas pipelines passing from the Caspian 
through Georgia on their way to European markets.  
 
                                               
29 ‘Kontseptsiia vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, 12 July 2008, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
website, http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-
osndoc.nsf/e2f289bea62097f9c325787a0034c255/d48737161a0bc944c32574870048d8f7!OpenDocum
ent, accessed 8 November 2011. 
30 ‘Interv’iu Dmitriia Medvedeva telekanalam “Rossiia”, Pervomu, NTV’, Sochi, 31 August 2008, 
President of Russia website, http://president.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2008/08/205991.shtml, accessed 1 
September 2008. 
31 This leaves aside the activity of Russian peace-keepers in Moldova in 1992, in Tajikistan up to 1997 
and in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In these cases the troops were present at the time of the Soviet 
collapse and their presence was regulated by international agreement. 
 9 
 But the origins of the war are much disputed. Was Russia or Georgia to 
blame? The initial, knee-jerk, reaction of much of the Western media and of most 
Western governments and NATO and the EU was to blame Russia.32 A year after the 
conflict, however, a commission appointed by the EU into the causes of the conflict, 
chaired by the Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini, was even-handed in its distribution of 
the blame. It blamed Saakashvili for the attack on Tskhinvali, the capital of the 
unrecognized republic of South Ossetia, but criticised Russia for sending troops deep 
into Georgia and keeping them there longer than was justified after the cease-fire. 33 It 
seems quite clear that Georgian troops initiated hostilities when they attacked and 
then occupied Tskhinvali, on 7 August. Russia appeared to have been caught 
unprepared; Putin was in Beijing for the opening of the Olympics and Medvedev was 
on holiday. It took a day before the Russian Security Council could meet. Russian 
troops came into South Ossetia, freed Tskhinvali, and proceed to march from South 
Ossetia into the rest of Georgia, towards Tbilisi. Reinforced via Abkhazia and from 
the Black Sea, they destroyed as much as they could of Georgian military assets and 
airports before withdrawing to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
 
 The alternative view has been put forward that it was the Russian side which 
initiated hostilities.34 The problem with this view is that it does not explain why 
Russia allowed Georgia to capture Tskhinvali. On the other hand, the Georgian 
assault can be seen as a response to Russian provocations. There had been clashes on 
the cease-fire lines for years and tension had been increasing. Saakashvili probably 
walked into a trap, despite warnings from US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice not 
to do so.35 Relations had been bad since before the Rose Revolution of 2003; they 
worsened after Saakashvili quadrupled defence spending and promised to restore the 
territorial integrity of Georgia. In 2006 the arrest of Russian ‘spies’ in Tbilisi had led 
to the Russian boycott of Georgian wine and the forced expulsions of ethnic 
Georgians from Russia. In 2008 Medvedev explicitly forbade any retaliation against 
the Georgian population of Russia – clearly differentiating himself from the earlier 
xenophobia.36 Even if Russia was responsible for provoking Georgia, as Jeffrey 
Mankoff says here is little reason to see the war as ‘Medvedev’s brainchild’.37 Rather, 
it seems that in the last months of his presidency Putin was trying to lock Medvedev 
into a tough policy towards Georgia.38    
 
                                               
32 Peter Shearman and Matthew Sussex, ‘The Roots of Russian Conduct’ in Paul B. Rich (ed.), Crisis 
in the Caucasus: Russia, Georgia and the West, Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2010, p. 2. 
33 Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report, 2009, 
http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html, accessed 14 October 2011.  
34 John B. Dunlop, ‘The August 2009 Russo-Georgia War: Which Side Went First?’, in Maria Raquel 
Freire and Roger E. Kanet (eds), Russia and its Near Neighbours, Basingstoke and New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 89-105. 
35 Ronald D. Asmus, A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia and the Future of the West, 
New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
36 For useful discussion of these issues, see John Berryman, ‘Russia, NATO Enlargement and “Regions 
of Privileged Interests”’, in Roger E. Kanet (ed.), Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, 
Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp. 228-45; Luke March, ‘Nationalist 
Grievance and Russian Foreign Policy: The Case of Georgia’, in Freire and Kanet, Russia and its Near 
Neighbours, pp. 63-88.  
37 Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics, 2nd edn, Lanham, MD 
and Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012, p. 86.  
38 Filippov, ‘Diversionary Role’, p. 1841. 
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In November 2011 Medvedev said that if Russia had faltered three years 
earlier, a number of countries might have joined NATO. This has been interpreted as 
admitting that Russia acted in 2008 in order to prevent Georgia joining the alliance.39 
But it still does not follow from this that Russia attacked first. In August 2012, 
differences appeared between Putin and Medvedev over their respective roles four 
years earlier. A film made by retired military officers had criticised Medvedev’s 
conduct of the war. It accused him of delaying the order to respond to the Georgian 
offensive, preferring to consult with foreign powers. Medvedev defended himself, 
claiming that he had led the war effort, while Putin had been in Beijing out of secure 
contact. Putin contradicted Medvedev, saying he had been in contact with military 
commanders while in Beijing. He added that he had approved a military plan for use 
against Georgia while still president,40 which does not mean that the war itself had 
been initiated by the Russian side.41 Despite the lack of clarity, none of this suggests 
that the war was Medvedev’s initiative. Once the war had started, however, it was 
Medvedev, not Putin, who was negotiating the cease-fire with French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy, on behalf of the EU, on terms favourable to Russia, although Putin 
was present too. Sakwa suggests the decision to recognize South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia as independent states allowed the president ‘to assert his dominance of the 
policy agenda’. Putin had consistently refused to give full recognition to the two 
entities.42 On the other hand, from early in 2008 Russia under Putin’s presidency had 
been treating them to a higher status. 
 
 As well as setting uncomfortable precedents in the Northern Caucasus, the 
decision to recognize the separatists led to Russia’s isolation on the issue. No CIS 
state, nor China, followed the Russian move; most had their own concerns about 
separatism. Still blaming Russia for the war, NATO suspended the NATO-Russia 
Council while the EU suspended negotiations on the new Partnership and Co-
operation Agreement. Economically, capital fled from Russia and the rouble fell. But 
Medvedev worked to rebuild relations with France and Germany. Already in 
November, the EU resumed work on the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement, 
and Sarkozy came out in favour of discussing Medvedev’s proposals on European 
security architecture.43 NATO resumed contacts with Russia in December, despite 
Condoleezza Rice’s opposition.44  
 
                                               
39 Brian Whitmore, ‘Medvedev gets Caught Telling the Truth’, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 22 
November 2011, http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/24399004.html, accessed 25 November 2011.  
40 ‘Russian Generals Accuse Medvedev of Hesitation in Russia-Georgia War’, Radio Free Europe / 
Radio Liberty, 8 August 2012, http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/24670673.html, accessed 9 August 
2012. 
41 Richard Sakwa, ‘Conspiracy Narratives as a Mode of Engagement in International Politics: The Case 
of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War’, Russian Review, 71, October 2012, 594. 
42 Richard Sakwa, ‘Great Powers and Small Wars in the Caucasus’, in Matthew Sussex (ed.), Conflict 
in the Former USSR, Cambridge: CUP, 2012, p. 87. 
43 Ahto Lobjakas, ‘Business, As Usual, to be Focus of EU-Russia Summit’, Radio Free Europe / Radio 
Liberty, 14 November 2008,  
http://www.rferl.org/content/Business_As_Usual_To_Be_Focus_Of_EURussia_Summit/1349153.html, 
accessed 4 July 2013; idem, ‘EU-Russia Summit Hints At Geopolitical Rapprochement’, Radio Free 
Europe / Radio Liberty, 14 November 2008,  
http://www.rferl.org/content/EURussia_Summit_Hints_At_Geopolitical_Rapprochement/1349273.htm
l, accessed 4 July 2013. 
44 Ian Traynor, ‘NATO snubs US by resuming Russia contacts’, Guardian, 3 December 2008. 
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At the end of 2008 Russia moved to assert itself against the other would-be 
NATO member, Ukraine under President Iushchenko. Ukraine’s failure to agree to 
new increased prices at the end of the contract led Putin to very publicly, in front of 
TV cameras, instruct Gazprom to reduce Ukraine’s supply. As an economic issue, this 
was within Putin’s remit; but it was clearly aimed at weakening Iushchenko and 
ensuring a more pro-Russian successor in the elections due in 2010. It appears that 
Ukraine responded by stealing gas intended for EU customers, and Gazprom then cut 
off supply to and through Ukraine completely.45. As a result people froze and died in 
several EU countries, prompting the European Commission to intensify its search for 
alternative sources of supply.46 The episode may have helped Gazprom’s finances in 
the medium term, as far as revenue from Ukraine was concerned. Nevertheless the 
episode damaged the company’s image, although (unlike the previous cut-off in 2006, 
when Russia had been seen as solely responsible) this time Russia and Ukraine were 
both blamed for their failure to agree. After two weeks Putin and Ukraine’s PM Iuliia 
Tymoshenko signed a deal.47 This incurred Iushchenko’s wrath and irrevocably split 
the ‘Orange’ camp in Ukraine.  
 
In this first period, it seems there was little difference between the policies of 
Putin and Medvedev. The president was locked in to Putin’s policies and had not yet 
developed freedom to manoeuvre. At the same time Medvedev was already showing a 
style that was more acceptable to the West than that of Putin. As a result Russia was 
able not only to stop NATO enlargement into post-Soviet space, but also to restore 
relations with it and with the EU quickly.  
 
 
February 2009 to September 2011. The ‘Reset’ 
 
In this second period of his presidency, Medvedev was able to take control of 
much of Russian foreign policy, and pursue cooperation with Western states further 
than Putin wished. US President Barack Obama realized early on that in the face of 
America’s priority foreign policy issues in Afghanistan, Iran, the Middle East and 
China it would be better to have Russia as a partner than an enemy. Hence in February 
2009, one month after Obama’s inauguration, Vice-President Joe Biden proposed a 
‘reset’ in US-Russian relations. This gave Medvedev a chance to improve relations 
with the United States and the West as whole. It is difficult to see Putin, after the 
rhetoric of 2006-2007, and with his macho KGB image, being so open to improving 
relations with America, even under a new leader. Obama ended the pressure for 
                                               
45 Tom Parfitt, ‘Ukraine accused of stealing Russian gas as fuel flow declines’, Guardian, 3 January 
2009; Simon Pirani, Jonathan Stern and Katja Yafimava, ‘The Russo-Ukrainian Gas Dispute of January 
2009: A Comprehensive Assessment’, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, NG 27, February 2009, 
http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/NG27-
TheRussoUkrainianGasDisputeofJanuary2009AComprehensiveAssessment-
JonathanSternSimonPiraniKatjaYafimava-2009.pdf , pp. 19-22, 49-51, accessed 3 April 2013.   
46 Luke Harding, ‘Deal to resume Russian gas eludes EU as 11 people die in big freeze-up’, Observer, 
11 January 2009. 
47 Pirani, Stern and Yafimava, ‘Russo-Ukrainian Gas Dispute’. I do not have space here to address the 
question as to what extent Gazprom and other large corporations are tools of Russian foreign policy, as 
well as being influential makers of policy. On Gazprom, see my ‘“Oligarchs”, Business and Russian 
Foreign Policy: From El'tsin to Putin’, 2007 (Economics Working Papers 83). Centre for the Study of 
Economic and Social Change in Europe, SSEES, UCL, pp. 16-23, http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/12932/, 
accessed 3 April 2013. 
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NATO enlargement into the former Soviet Union; in September 2009 halted MD 
deployment plans in Poland and the Czech Republic; and in April 2010 with 
Medvedev in Moscow signed the ‘New START’ treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty). As well as reducing the number of strategic nuclear weapons held by each 
side, it restored a verification regime.48 These measures created the climate for 
Medvedev to include the West in his modernization agenda. 
 
Unlike Putin, Medvedev spoke of the need for political changes to enable 
Russia’s economic modernization and its diversification form dependence on 
hydrocarbons and minerals. Both leaders saw the need for Western technology for 
modernization. The most high-profile initiative associated with Medvedev, following 
his visit to Silicon Valley, is the attempt to create a Russian imitation at Skolkovo, 
combining American, European and Russian technologies. In May 2010 Russian 
Newsweek received a leaked copy of a document by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
showing, country by country, how foreign policy could aid Medvedev’s 
modernization programme. (Britain was the only significant country excluded, in the 
continuing aftermath of the murder of Aleksandr Litvinenko.)49 The following month 
Russia signed a ‘Partnership for Modernization’ with the EU. 
 
Linked to this was Medvedev’s push for membership of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). This move would help some industries but hinder others. 
Undoubtedly it would help the Russian steel industry; energy companies, reliant on 
foreign exports, would benefit from the reputational gain of Russia being now a law-
abiding member of the international trading system. Other manufacturing industries, 
notably the motor industry, feared exposure to foreign competition, and the oligarch 
Oleg Deripaska (who vied with Abramovich for the post of wealthiest man in Russia), 
owner of the Gorky Automobile Factory (GAZ), vocally opposed accession. In June 
2009 Putin said that Russia would join the WTO as part of the Customs Union of the 
Eurasian Economic Community, together with Belarus and Kazakhstan, and would 
focus on the consolidation of this association first. Medvedev responded the following 
day that it would be ‘simpler and more realistic’ for Russia to enter on its own.50 By 
2010 Putin seemed to have lost enthusiasm for the WTO; after the harvest failure, 
when Russia imposed restrictions on grain export, Putin pointed out that such a move 
would have been impossible if Russia had already been a member.  It was Medvedev, 
not Putin, who had his way, even on this economic issue; in December 2011 all 
conditions having been filled and other objections (including from Georgia) having 
been dropped, Russia on its own was invited to join the WTO, 18 years after 
applying.51 This was an essential difference between Putin and Medvedev; Putin 
prioritized integration within the CIS, while Medvedev prioritized Russia’s WTO 
entry.  
                                               
48 Marcin Kaczmarski, ‘The Fragile “Reset”: The Balance and the Prospects for Changes in  Russian-
US Relations’, April 2011, Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), Warsaw, Policy Briefs, 
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/policy-briefs/2011-04-11/fragile-reset-balance-sheet-and-
prospects-changes-russianus-rela accessed 12 October 2012. 
49 ‘Programma effektivnogo ispol’zovaniia na sistemnoi osnove vneshnepoliticheskikh faktorov v 
tseliakh dolgosrochnogo razvitiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Russian Newsweek, 10 February 2010, from 
http://www.runewsweek.ru/country/34184/, accessed 12 May 2010 but no longer available due to the 
closure of Russian Newsweek. 
50 ‘Medvedev versus Putin’, Forbes. 
51 On differences inside Russia on the WTO, see Anders Åslund, ‘Why Doesn’t Russia Join the 
WTO?’, Washington Quarterly, 33, 2, April 2010, 49-63. 
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The Reset was not one-way traffic. In exchange, Medvedev helped the 
Americans and their allies in several ways. NATO returned to the NATO-Russia 
Council in December 2009. In November 2010 Medvedev attended a NATO-Russia 
Council summit in Lisbon, where Russia agreed to allow countries of the NATO-led 
International Security Assistance Force to transport military goods by air or land 
across Russia and Central Asia to Afghanistan.52 In view of both security and political 
difficulties with the usual transit route across Pakistan, this was a major help to the 
NATO countries fighting the Taliban. Later it was agreed to allow NATO to establish 
a transit hub in Russia, at Ulyanovsk. In 2010 Russia voted at the UN Security 
Council to impose sanctions on Iran and North Korea over the two countries’ nuclear 
programmes, and in the case of Iran, to cancel a contract for the supply of S-300 
surface-to-air missiles.  
 
But it was in relation to the Arab Spring that Medvedev took his support for 
the West furthest, leading to an open clash with Putin. In March 2011 Russia 
abstained at the UN Security Council over a US-UK resolution establishing a no-fly-
zone over parts of Libya, ostensibly to protect the civilian population in revolt against 
Col. Muammar al-Gaddafi from the regime’s bombing reprisals. Putin favoured a 
veto, expecting that the resolution would presage a NATO military intervention in 
Libya which would ultimately result in regime change. Putin was defending Russia’s 
considerable investments in Libya’s oil industry and its military links with Gaddafi. 
When Putin openly accused the West of launching a ‘crusade’ against Libya, 
Medvedev retorted that such language was ‘unacceptable’. Putin then appeared to 
climb down, saying, ‘it is the Russian president who is in charge of foreign policy and 
there can be no divergence.’53 
 
Problems nevertheless emerged in the Reset. It turned out that Obama had not 
abandoned MD, but was moving its deployment to Romania. There was no positive 
response to Russia’s request to build a joint, sectorally-based, system with NATO 
against the missiles of ‘rogue states’. Medvedev made some bellicose remarks about 
deploying Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad province if MD went ahead. The Obama 
administration did not push human rights issues with anything approaching the zeal of 
the Bush administration, but politically it could not ignore them. The focus shifted 
from Chechnia to Moscow, with Khodorkovskii’s second trial and continued murders 
and repression of journalists and lawyers. After some time, the murder of the Russian 
lawyer Sergei Magnitskii in a Moscow prison in December 2009 came to dominate 
these concerns. 
 
 Problems also developed in Russia’s relations with the EU, at least in 
comparison with the situation after the war with Georgia. But there were problems 
here too. An effect of the January 2009 gas cut-off was to damage the reputations of 
both Russia and Ukraine. Partly in reaction to this, but more to the war with Georgia, 
the EU in 2009 developed the European Neighbourhood Policy in a new framework, 
aimed at former Soviet republics. This ‘Eastern Partnership’ (EaP) included Ukraine, 
Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, but excluded Russia and 
                                               
52 ‘NATO-Russia Council Joint Statement’, 20 November 2010, 
http://eng.new.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/39/print, accessed 15 August 2011. 
53 Brian Whitmore, ‘Battle Lines Being Drawn?’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 22 March 2011, 
http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/2346539.html, accessed 29 March 2011, 
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Central Asia. For Russia, this was unacceptable meddling in its zone of privileged 
interests. In November 2009 Medvedev published a draft Treaty on European 
Security, building on his Berlin speech, but this found little enthusiasm.54 By insisting 
that no state should increase its security at the expense of others, it was seen as 
interfering with the sovereign right of states to join NATO. It was shuffled off to be 
discussed within the OSCE.55 In relation to energy, Gazprom’s Nord Stream pipeline 
to Germany opened in 2011, having overcome objections from Poland and the Baltic 
States and achieved recognition as an EU project. The corporation’s South Stream 
project, however, was in direct opposition to the EU’s Nabucco project, and the 
European Commission’s ‘Third Energy Package’ was openly aimed at breaking up 
Gazprom’s monopolistic ownership of pipelines.56 In bilateral relations within 
Europe, the most important ‘reset’ was with Poland. Following the defeat of the 
Kaczynski brothers’ nationalistic ‘Law and Justice’ Party and the victory of Civic 
Platform under Donald Tusk in the 2007 parliamentary elections in Poland, the way 
was prepared for reconciliation. Since Lech Kaczynski remained president, however, 
for protocol reasons it was Putin as prime minister who went to Katyn to express 
remorse for the Soviet massacre of Polish officers in 1940.. 
 
One might perhaps expect that the improvement of relations with the West 
would be at the expense of relations with China. Could Medvedev with his liberal 
rhetoric follow Putin’s path of increasing relations with its totalitarian Communist-
ruled neighbour? In fact the rhetoric of strategic partnership begun under Putin 
continued. Indeed, whereas Putin’s first foreign visit after his inauguration in 2000 
had been to Britain, via Belarus, Medvedev’s first trip abroad was to China, via 
Kazakhstan. At the UN Security Council, China and Russia regularly voted together; 
Russia’s influence over China’s voting on Middle East issues ensured that China did 
not veto the resolutions mentioned above on Iran and Libya. The level of Russian 
arms sales to China fell, but plans to develop oil and gas pipelines proceeded. With 
the financial crisis in the West, in 2010 China overtook Germany, according to 
Russian official figures, as Russia’s largest trade partner state. Medvedev made the 
first visit by a Russian or Soviet leader to the disputed Southern Kurile islands, the 
Japanese ‘Northern Territories’, leading to criticism in Tokyo. The main defence 
documents of this period - the ‘National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation 
to 2020’, May 2009, and the Military Doctrine of February 2010, were silent about the 
implications for Russian security of China’s rapid peaceful rise.57  
 
As Nikita Lomagin points out, China as a security concern cannot be ignored 
indefinitely.58 The balance of Russia’s internal military deployments has moved 
                                               
54 ‘European Security Treaty’, Draft, 29 November 2009, Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, 
http://www.mid.ru/ns-dvbr.nsf/dveurope/065fc3182ca460d1c325767f003073cc, accessed 3 April 2013.  
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58 Lomagin, ‘Medvedev’s “Fourteen Points”’, p. 193. See also Martin Kaczmarski, ‘The Bear Watches 
the Dragon: The Russian Debate on China’, Point of View no. 31, Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), 
 15 
towards the East. The apparent paradox of Medvedev’s plans for substantial 
acceleration in military spending, unveiled in 2011 when the Reset was still operating, 
might be partly explained by the Chinese factor, even at a time when joint exercises 
with China through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) were regularly 
taking place. A symbol of Medvedev’s success in improving relations on all sides was 
the celebration of the 65th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany on 9 May 2010. 
Troops from America, Britain, France and Poland joined the Russian parade in Red 
Square, and the leaders of Germany and China joined the Russian leaders on the 
podium next to the Lenin Mausoleum.  
 
Turning to Russia’s policies within the CIS, probably the most important gain 
during this period was the victory of Viktor Ianukovych in the Ukrainian presidential 
election in February 2010. This reversed the consequences of the Orange Revolution, 
which had been the biggest disaster for Russian foreign policy during Putin’s 
presidency. Russia in 2009-10 had better tactics than the all-out support for 
Ianukovych shown in 2004. Medvedev exploited the disputes within the Orange 
camp. In August 2009 he published an open letter to President Iushchenko. He 
condemned the Ukrainian leader for supporting Georgia in 2008, seeking to move 
Ukraine towards NATO accusing the USSR of genocide against the Ukrainian people 
in the famine of 1932-3, and making the anti-Soviet rebel Stepan Bandera Hero of 
Ukraine.59 From September Medvedev boycotted Iushchenko, even refusing to speak 
to him at CIS Heads of State summits. Iushchenko came fourth in the first round of 
the presidential election; Russia made clear it was willing to work with whoever won 
the second round, Tymoshenko or Ianukovych. Notwithstanding the role that 
Tymoshenko had played in the Orange Revolution, there were even suggestions that 
she was Putin’s preferred candidate following their cooperation to end the 2009 gas 
crisis. Ianukovich, however, was elected on the basis of the votes of the Russia-facing 
Eastern and Southern Ukraine, in February 2010. He immediately withdrew Ukraine’s 
application to join NATO; and two months later, following negotiations with 
Medvedev, signed the Kharkiv accords. These extended the lease on the basing of the 
Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol from 2017 to 2042, in exchange for cheaper 
gas. Gazprom was compensated out of the Russian state budget. This agreement 
would have the effect of keeping Russia out of NATO for as long as it ran. 
Ianukovych also allowed the Russia-led military alliance, the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization (CSTO), to open an office in Kyiv, and a discussion began in the 
parliament as to whether Ukraine should join. At the same time Ianukovych resisted 
Medvedev’s attempts to bring Ukrainian economic assets, in particular pipelines, 
under Russian control, and refused to join the Common Economic Space or the 
Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.60 
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Not all was smooth with the Customs Union, established in July 2010. Seeking 
to reduce his dependence on Russia, Belarus president Aliaksandr Lukashenka made 
overtures to the EU prior to the December 2010 presidential election, promising a free 
election and the observance of human rights. After the election, however, most of the 
opposition candidates were arrested and protest demonstrations were bloodily 
dispersed. The EU was forced to condemn Lukashenka’s actions and he had no 
option, in order to continue to receive subsides from someone to prop up his stagnant 
regime, but to turn back to Russia. On schedule, the Customs Union became the 
Common Economic Space in January 2012. Lukashenka’s toing and froing did not 
prevent the Russian foreign ministry from joining Western condemnation of 
Lukashenka’s human rights policies. When Ianukovych followed Lukashenka’s path 
and had Tymoshenko jailed in August 2011, Russia again joined the Western criticism 
(particularly as she was being formally accused over her gas deal with Putin). 
 
On Moldova, Russia’s position did not get worse during the Medvedev 
presidency, despite the election in 2009 of a government led by the ‘Alliance for 
European Integration’ and the fall of the Communist president Vladimir Voronin. In 
June 2010, provisionally accepting Medvedev’s proposal for an EU-Russia Security 
Council, German Chancellor Angela Merkel insisted that he tackle the issue of 
Transdniestria in order to show good faith. The result was the establishment of what 
was called the Meseberg process.61 The defeat of Igor Smirnov in the Transdniestrian 
presidential elections in December 2011 undoubtedly removed an obstacle to 
progress, but it remains unclear what role Russia played in this.62 It seemed that 
Medvedev would not allow a solution unless it provided for the continuation of a 
Russian base in Moldova and a commitment from Chisinau not to join NATO. This 
was in line with his concept of a ‘sphere of privileged interests’; one of the key 
interests here was that of the Russian military. 
 
In Central Asia, Kazakhstan remained Russia’s leading partner. Medvedev 
showed the importance he attached to President Nursultan Nazarbaev by making his 
country the first that he visited outside Russia after his inauguration, on the way to 
Beijing.63 Kazakhstan remained a reliable member of the Eurasian Economic 
Community and then the Customs Union and Common Economic Space, and of the 
CSTO. Uzbekistan, on the other hand, given the low priority of human rights under 
Obama, moved closer to Washington and proved an increasingly restless member of 
the CSTO. The popular uprising against President Kurmanbek Bakiev of Kyrgyzstan 
in April 2010 represented an opportunity for Moscow to increase its influence and 
bring about the closure of the American base at Manas. Following the outbreak of 
ethnic violence in Osh, however, Medvedev rejected the appeal of the new temporary 
leader, Roza Otunbaeva, to send troops to restore order.  
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This might be attributed to the fear of appearing in the West, less than two 
years after the Georgia war, as an aggressive military power; or it may have been the 
fear of being sucked into an ethnic conflict from which it would be hard to get out. 
The impression was given, however, that Russia was not living up to its 
responsibilities in its region of privileged interests. After America announced that it 
would withdraw its forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, Russian policy 
makers became increasingly concerned about what might follow, and the implications 
for the security of Central Asia and of Russia itself. It seemed unavoidable, however, 
that either the CSTO or the SCO, or possibly both, would have an increased role in 
stabilizing the region after the NATO retreat. 
 
Finally, one must note Medvedev’s strenuous efforts to find a settlement in 
Nagornyi Karabakh. Russia’s only CSTO ally in Transcaucasia remained Armenia, 
but in order to isolate Saakashvili’s Georgia Medvedev needed better relations with 
Azerbaijan. Perhaps more importantly, Russia wanted to ensure that Azerbaijan’s gas 
reached Europe via Russia rather than via Georgia and Turkey. At the Kazan summit 
in June 2011, hopes were raised of an agreed peace process between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, brokered by Medvedev. But there was no breakthrough, as neither side 
was persuaded to make the necessary concessions. Medvedev’s final attempt, in Sochi 
in January 2012, also failed to bring results. Perhaps the most that could be said for 
Medvedev’s efforts was that the conflict did not unfreeze, unlike in Georgia in 2008; 
but that also reflected the caution of the Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders.  
 
It seems clear that in this period, Medvedev was the key decision-maker in 
Russian foreign policy. While the differences between Medvedev and Putin were 
generally not huge, in some areas they were significant. Putin did not oppose the 
‘Reset’ as such, but he did not want to take it as far as Medvedev did. For the 
president, the West was an essential part of his programme for Russia’s 
modernization; hence he was not prepared to jeopardize Russia’s relations with the 
West by vetoing the Anglo-American UN resolution on Libya. Putin was not prepared 
to go so far as to legitimize NATO action against one of Russia’s friends. On the 
WTO, too, Medvedev’s desire to join this international regulatory body for the 
benefits it would bring to Russia’s modernization trumped Putin’s desire to first 
pursue integration in post-Soviet space. The other major success of the period, the 
reversal of the results of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the extension of the 
lease of Sevastopol, was an issue on which Putin and Medvedev shared the same aim. 
 
September 2011 to May 2012. The Rhetoric 
 
After Medvedev announced in September 2011 that Putin would be the 
Kremlin’s candidate for the presidency the following May, foreign leaders knew that 
henceforth they had to deal with Putin directly if they wished to make lasting deals. 
Medvedev’s influence plummeted externally as much as internally. On 4 October 
Putin published an article in Izvestiia (formerly the newspaper of the government of 
the USSR) outlining his idea that the Common Economic Space of Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan could become a ‘Eurasian Economic Union’ and then a ‘Eurasian 
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Union’.64 This was to be the main foreign policy plank of his electoral campaign, 
appealing to nostalgia for the Soviet Union. It appears indeed to be the case that 
economic integration in the Customs Union has been proceeding and is moving 
towards the establishment of an a Eurasian Economic Union by 2015.65 The proposal 
for a political union, however, has much less attraction for Belarus and Kazakhstan. 
 
At the same time relations with the United States, at least rhetorically, were 
deteriorating. On Russian television on 23 November, Medvedev threatened that if 
America did not give Russia legally binding guarantees that the Missile Defence 
system would never be used against the country, Moscow might withdraw from the 
New START treaty, deploy missiles in Kaliningrad oblast’ and create the capacity to 
destroy the Missile Defence system.66 This was eleven days before the State Duma 
elections, and it recalled Putin’s harnessing of anti-Western rhetoric prior to the 2007 
elections.67 
 
Following the State Duma elections of December 2011 came a wave of 
protests,  unprecedented since Putin’s rise to power, against electoral fraud. Taken by 
surprise, Putin contradictorily praised the civic awareness of the protestors and 
blamed the US embassy for paying them. The OSCE observers, and EU and American 
leaders criticised the conduct of the elections and the treatment of the protestors. This 
coincided with a growing awareness in the West of the significance of the Magnitskii 
case and what it revealed about the criminalized nature of parts of the Russian state 
and of some of the group around Putin. One week before his election, in February 
2012, Putin published an article on foreign policy in Moskovskie novosti. He accused 
the USA and NATO of ‘stereotypes of bloc thinking’, with NATO expansion and MD 
infrastructure. ‘The Americans’, he wrote, ‘have become obsessed with securing for 
themselves absolute invulnerability.’ In contrast, with China there was ‘an 
unprecedentedly high level of trust between the leaders of the two countries’. He 
rejected Western calls for a UN Security Council resolution to allow foreign 
intervention against Bashar al-Asad’s regime. ‘No one should be allowed to 
implement a ‘Libyan scenario’ in Syria.’ In an undisguised reference to his spat with 
Medvedev the previous year, Putin wrote: ‘Taught by bitter experience, we are against 
passing resolutions at the UN Security Council which could be taken as a signal for 
military intervention in the processes inside Syria.’ Needless to say, on this Putin’s 
voice now prevailed. Notably, there was virtually no mention of the CIS states in this 
article, perhaps because Putin no longer considered them as foreign.68 
 
                                               
64 V.V. Putin, Stat’ia v gazete “Izvestiia”, ‘Novyi integratsionnyi proekt dlia Evrazii - budushchee, 
kotoroe rozhdaetsia segodnia’, 4 October 2011, website of Prime Minister, 
http://premier.gov.ru/events/news/16622/print/, accessed 19 January 2012. 
65 Evgeny Vinokurov, Alexander Libman, ‘Post-Soviet Integration Breakthrough: Why the Customs 
Union has more Chances than its Predecessors’, 24 June 2012, Russia in Global Affairs, 
http://eng.global affairs.ru/print/number/Post-Soviet-Integration-Breakthrough-15580, accessed 3 July 
2012; Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk, ‘Russia, the Eurasian Customs Union and the EU: 
Cooperation, Stagnation or Rivalry/’, Chatham House, Briefing Paper, Russia and Eurasia Programme, 
August 2012, REF  BP 2012/01, pp. 4-8. 
66 ‘Russian President Threatens to Target U.S. Missile Shield’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 23 
November 2011, http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/24399845.html. accessed 25 November 2011. 
67 See my ‘Russia, the West and the 2007-2008 Electoral Cycle’, pp. 5, 12-13. 
68 V.V. Putin, Iz stat’i v gazete “Moskovskie novosti”, ‘Rossiia i meniaiushchiisia mir’, 27 February 
2012, website of Prime Minister, http://premier.gov.ru/events/news/18252/print/, accessed 2 March 
2012. 
 19 
Following Putin’s inauguration as president in May 2012, he immediately took 
some measures which together appeared to distance him somewhat from Medvedev’s 
foreign policy. He signed a decree ‘On measures to implement the foreign policy 
course of the Russian Federation’. The largest section of this concerned cooperation 
with the other former Soviet republics.69 Putin took Ushakov, who had been his 
foreign policy adviser when he had been prime minister, with him into the Kremlin, 
while Sergei Prikhod’ko, who had been the foreign policy adviser to presidents from 
El’tsin onwards, went with Medvedev into the new prime minister’s office.70 The 
foreign ministry was ordered to draft a new foreign policy concept. Putin snubbed 
Obama by not attending the G8 summit in Washington that month. All these measures 
indicated real differences between Putin and Medvedev over foreign policy. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 During Medvedev’s presidency, two changes inside Russia had important 
effects on foreign policy. Medvedev’s rise to the top position did not lead to a 
fundamental alteration in foreign policy, but he was more open to the ideas of political 
liberalization than Putin. This facilitated his relations with the West and allowed the 
Reset to happen, while his pragmatism allowed the strategic partnership with China to 
be maintained. The second change, the announcement that Putin was coming back, 
was followed by rigged elections and protests. Since these were blamed on the West, 
relations deteriorated. Putin and Medvedev shared a belief in Russia as a great power, 
and a pragmatic outlook. Both saw it as a priority to stop further NATO enlargement 
into the former Soviet Union. Within this, though, Medvedev leaned more towards 
collaboration with the West, and Putin leaned more towards Eurasian integration, 
based on the CIS states. 
 
 While in his first few months in power Medvedev was tied down by Putin’s 
policies, by early 2009 he was in charge of foreign policy. Differences between the 
tandem emerged into the open over the World Trade Organization and Libya, and in 
both cases Medvedev’s policy was implemented. Only after the announcement that 
Putin would return as president did Medvedev have to play second fiddle again.   
 
 The period demonstrates that Russian foreign policy is reactive rather than 
pro-active. The major change in foreign policy came in response to change in 
Washington, the idea of the ‘Reset’, which led to a substantial improvement in 
relations with the United States and with almost all other Western states. On a smaller 
scale, the improvement of relations with Poland came after the election of Civic 
Platform, willing to overcome the existing tensions.  
 
Despite the deterioration of relations with the West at the end of the period, 
one can identify at least five major foreign-policy achievements of Medvedev’s 
presidency. The war with Georgia at the very least postponed NATO enlargement into 
                                               
69 V. Putin, ‘Ukaz prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii. O merakh po realizatsii vneshnepoliticheskogo 
kursa Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, 7 May 2012, http://graph.document.kremlin.ru/page.aspx?1610881, 
accessed 4 December 2012. 
70 Dan Peleshchuk, ‘New Presidential Administration Raises Questions over  Ruling Tandem’, RIA-
Novosti, 22 May 2012, http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20120522/173612250.html, accessed 4 December 
2012. 
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post-Soviet space, as it was clear that the alliance could not give a credible guarantee 
to Russia’s neighbours. Secondly, the defeat of the leaders of the Orange Revolution 
allowed Russia to extend the lease of Sevastopol, and keep Ukraine out of NATO 
until 2042. Thirdly, the ‘New START’ treaty restored dynamism to Russian-US 
relations and raised Russia’s international prestige. Fourth, entry to the WTO, while 
unlikely to have a huge effect on the Russian economy, nevertheless enhanced 
Russia’s international prestige and allowed it to play a role as a rule-maker in 
international trade negotiations. Fifth, at the same time the implementation of the 
Common Economic Space with Belarus and Kazakhstan appeared to be working to 
plan, and likely to attract Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as new members in the future, 
even though it was unlikely to develop into Putin’s ‘Eurasian Union’.  
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